Tarptautinio verslo derybų strategijų rengimą įtakojantys veiksniai: kainų diskriminacijos viešuosiuose pirkimuose atvejai

Abstract

Nesant konkurencijos, leidžiant monopolistui vykdyti kainų diskriminaciją, produkcijos pardavimo kiekiai gali padidėti, nustatant mažesnes kainas tam tikroms vartotojų grupėms, kurių atstovai kitaip nebūtų pirkę. Jei kainų diskriminacija nėra tobula, tai ji padidina vartotojų gerovę - tai yra, jei kaina neatitinka kiekvieno vartotojo atliekamo produkto vertinimo, tada diskriminacija leidžia papildomiems vartotojams įsigyti produktą už kainą, kuri yra mažesnė už tą, kurią jie būtų norėję už tai sumokėti. Tai dažnai lemia neigiamus padarinius tiek vartotojams, tiek ir pardavėjams. Šiuo aspektu atsiveria galimybės tarptautiniam verslui, nes kitų rinkų atstovų intervencija gali suteikti papildomas alternatyvas pirkėjams, sumažinant iškreiptos konkurencijos neigiamą įtaką derybų dalyvių derybinių galių balansui. Tačiau šiuo atveju yra susiduriama su kita problema vertinant rinkos dalyvių koncentraciją, jų įtaką kainų diskriminacijai. Straipsnio tikslas yra kompleksiškai išanalizuoti susiklosčiusią derybų strategijos rengimo teoriją ir praktiką, esant skirtingam konkurencijos lygiui, atskleisti šių strategijų kūrimo ir įgyvendinimo tobulinimo galimybes, atsižvelgiant į kainų diskriminacijos problemas. Straipsnio objektas yra derybų strategijų rengimas, esant skirtingam konkurencijos lygiui, atsižvelgiant į kainų diskriminacijos problemas. Darbo problema – derybų teorijoje yra nepakankamai priemonių, padedančių parengti derybų strategijas, esant skirtingam konkurencijos lygiui ir kainų diskriminacijos problemoms. Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas matematinis oligopolijos modelis. Šio modelio pagalba nagrinėjamos adekvačios ir efektyvios derybų strategijos rengimo galimybės, esant iškreiptai rinkos konkurencijai.

In the absence of competition, allowing monopolists to discriminate on prices, sales volumes may increase by adopting lower prices for certain groups of consumers who would not otherwise have purchased. If price discrimination is not perfect, it increases consumer welfare - that is, if the price does not correspond to the evaluation of each product by the consumer, then discrimination allows for additional consumers to buy the product at a price, which is lower than the one they would have liked to pay for it. This often results in negative consequences for both consumers and sellers. In this case opportunities for international business are opening, as intervention from other markets can provide additional alternatives to buyers by reducing the negative impact of distorted competition for the balance of negotiating power of negotiators. But there is another problem here in assessing the concentration of market participants, their impact on price discrimination. The aim of the article is to analyze the existing theory and practice of negotiation strategy in a complex way, at different levels of competition, to reveal possibilities to develop and implement these strategies, taking into account the problems of price discrimination. The object of the article is the preparation of negotiation strategies at different levels of competition, taking into account the problems of price discrimination. The article deals with the problem - there are not enough tools in the negotiation theory to help develop negotiation strategies with different levels of competition and price discrimination problems. The paper analyzes the mathematical model of oligopoly. This model explores the feasibility and effectiveness of negotiation strategy preparation in the face of distorted market competition. In the absence of competition where a monopolist is able to apply price discrimination, sales volumes may increase when a monopolist fixes lower prices for groups of consumers who would not have bought at higher prices. If price discrimination is not perfect, then this discrimination increases consumer welfare, that is, if the price does not correspond to the evaluation of each product by the consumer, then discrimination allows additional consumers to buy the product at a price lower than that, which they would have paid for it. However, while this discrimination may increase the sales volume of the product, it would also increase the price for those consumers who wanted and could pay more for the product, and this higher price may exceed the price that some buyers from this consumer group expected to pay. For this reason, some customers from this consumer group will not buy the product, even though they value it more than new consumers who buy the product at a lower price. In such a case, discrimination can be ineffective because the market does not offer enough products or services at a reasonable price to those who value them most. In addition, price discrimination also leads to the transfer of consumer welfare to the welfare of producers. For example, the gain from trading with those consumers who would buy in any case (excess or difference between price and willingness to pay is passed on to the producer (as a profit). This does not necessarily mean that the total consumer welfare is reduced, because if the volume of the production sales increases, it can be created additional benefits for other users.