International business negotiation strategies: cases of discrimination in public procurements

Abstract

In the absence of competition, allowing monopolists to discriminate on prices, sales volumes may increase by adopting lower prices for certain groups of consumers who would not otherwise have purchased. If price discrimination is not perfect, it increases consumer welfare - that is, if the price does not correspond to the evaluation of each product by the consumer, then discrimination allows for additional consumers to buy the product at a price, which is lower than the one they would have liked to pay for it. This often results in negative consequences for both consumers and sellers. In this case opportunities for international business are opening, as intervention from other markets can provide additional alternatives to buyers by reducing the negative impact of distorted competition for the balance of negotiating power of negotiators. But there is another problem here in assessing the concentration of market participants, their impact on price discrimination. The aim of the article is to analyze the existing theory and practice of negotiation strategy in a complex way, at different levels of competition, to reveal possibilities to develop and implement these strategies, taking into account the problems of price discrimination. The object of the article is the preparation of negotiation strategies at different levels of competition, taking into account the problems of price discrimination. The article deals with the problem - there are not enough tools in the negotiation theory to help develop negotiation strategies with different levels of competition and price discrimination problems. The paper analyzes the mathematical model of oligopoly. This model explores the feasibility and effectiveness of negotiation strategy preparation in the face of distorted market competition.