Rodyti trumpą aprašą

dc.rights.licenseKūrybinių bendrijų licencija / Creative Commons licenceen_US
dc.contributor.authorPeckienė, Aurelija
dc.contributor.authorKomarovska, Andzelika
dc.contributor.authorUstinovičius, Leonas
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-20T09:16:37Z
dc.date.available2025-05-20T09:16:37Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1877-7058en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://etalpykla.vilniustech.lt/handle/123456789/157657
dc.description.abstractCertain risks are inherent in all construction projects. These risks are faced by all parties involved in a project – owners, contractors, designers, suppliers, etc. However, the more important role the parties play in the development and successful completion of the project, the greater risks they have to carry. Such parties are the owner and the contractor who conclude a contract to carry out construction works. Shifting the risk onto one of the parties to a construction contract agreement is inequitable and unreasonable. Equitable allocation of risks among parties is very important. Analysis results shows that in the area of risk allocation between construction parties many research is done and work is still ongoing, the most work in this area is done by scientists of China, USA, Australia and Great Britain. Although, on the one hand, relevant studies emphasize equitable risk allocation, on the other hand, the task of proper allocation of risks among parties is placed within one party only, i.e., the owner. This automatically “programmes” improper risk allocation results. According to the author, risk allocation among the parties to a construction contract agreement should invoke cooperative game theory which application for the aforementioned purpose is the object of further research of the authors.en_US
dc.format.extent6 p.en_US
dc.format.mediumTekstas / Texten_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.urihttps://etalpykla.vilniustech.lt/handle/123456789/156173en_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.source.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705813008461en_US
dc.subjectrisk allocationen_US
dc.subjectconstructionen_US
dc.subjectcontracten_US
dc.subjectcooperative game theoryen_US
dc.titleOverview of risk allocation between construction partiesen_US
dc.typeKonferencijos publikacija / Conference paperen_US
dcterms.accessRightsLaisvai prieinamas / Openly availableen_US
dcterms.accrualMethodRankinis pateikimas / Manual submissionen_US
dcterms.issued2013-05-17
dcterms.licenseCC BY NC NDen_US
dcterms.references40en_US
dc.description.versionTaip / Yesen_US
dc.contributor.institutionVilniaus Gedimino technikos universitetasen_US
dc.contributor.institutionVilnius Gediminas Technical Universityen_US
dc.contributor.facultyStatybos fakultetas / Faculty of Civil Engineeringen_US
dcterms.sourcetitleProcedia Engineeringen_US
dc.description.volumevol. 57en_US
dc.publisher.nameElsevieren_US
dc.publisher.countryUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.publisher.cityOxforden_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2013.04.113en_US


Šio įrašo failai

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

Šis įrašas yra šioje (-se) kolekcijoje (-ose)

Rodyti trumpą aprašą

Kūrybinių bendrijų licencija / Creative Commons licence
Išskyrus atvejus, kai nurodyta kitaip, šio įrašo licencija apibrėžiama taipKūrybinių bendrijų licencija / Creative Commons licence